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ABSTRACT 
The risk-capital positions of Japanese banks have been under tension throughout the 1990s. 
However, existing theory on the determinants of bank risk-taking still remains limited and the 
evidence is conflicting. Most studies concentrate on US and European banks, while empirical 
evidence has remained scarce for Asian banks. Added to that, to our knowledge,  there are 
almost no papers on this subject for cooperative banks in Japan. Thus, the main contribution of 
this  study  is  to  shed  some  light  on  the  determinants  of  bank  risk-taking  and  analyse  its 
relationship with capital and efficiency in Japanese cooperative banking (namely shinkin and 
credit  cooperatives  banks).  This  paper  focuses  on  Japanese  cooperative  banks  as  they 
constitute an important segment of the Japanese banking sector. We employ a simultaneous 
equation  model  in  which  the  relationships  between,  risk,  capital  and  cost  inefficiency  are 
modelled. Two stage least squares with fixed effects estimation procedure are applied to a panel 
data set of 263 Japanese cooperative banks over the period 2003 through 2006. The results 
confirm the belief that risk, capital and inefficiency are simultaneously determined. The empirical 
model  shows  a  negative  relationship  between  risk  and  the  level  of  capital  for  Japanese 
cooperative banks. Inefficient Japanese cooperative banks appear to operate with larger capital 
and take on more risk. These arguments may reflect the moral hazard problem that exists in the 
banking system through exploitation of the benefits of deposit insurance. We also assess the 
size effects and find that larger cooperative banks holding less capital take on more risk and are 
less efficient.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The successive banking crises that have occurred around the world reveal that banks often take 
excessive risks and these continuous crises have adverse snow-ball effects on the financial system 
and the real economy as well. The Japanese banking industry hasn’t been spared and has indeed 
been hit by the banking crisis during the 1990s. Even some of the leading financial institutions failed 
to survive the financial turmoil. Burdened with bad loans and eroded capital positions, they had to 
withdraw from international markets and tried to solve their problems domestically. More specifically, 
the  risk-capital  positions  of  Japanese  banks  have  been  under  tension  throughout  the  1990s. 
Pressure on banks to increase capital to asset ratios and reduce risk-taking activities has been 
referred to as an explanation for the reduction in aggregate lending in the 1990s.  
Based on the drastic changes that have occurred over the last 20 years in Japan, the Japanese 
banking system represents  an interesting sector to analyse.  The Japanese banking structure is 
composed of a very small number of very large banking groups and a very large number of very 
small institutions but has undergone a sharp decline of the total number of institutions in recent 
years. In this paper, we will address an important subset of Japanese private depository institutions 
namely  cooperative  banks  comprising  Shinkin  (also  Known  as  credit  associations)  and  credit 
cooperative banks
1. They have played a critical role in the sustainable growth of regional economies 
and the SMEs that operate there. However, the cooperative banking sector has also been affected  
by the severe recession and economic slump during the 1990s and suffered mo re bankruptcies 
than the rest of the banking sector.   
                                                 
1  Shinkin banks are cooperative financial institutions whose members are individuals and small/medium sized enterprises  
   (SMEs). They operate in a similar way to commercial banks but in principle limit lending to members. On the other hand,  
   credit cooperative banks accept deposits from members of the cooperative, government municipalities and non- 
   profit organisation. Among the 176 bankrupted depository institutions during the period 1990-2001, Shinkin and credit  
   cooperative banks together accounted for about 89% (Hanazaki, M., & A. Horiuchi, 2003). As part of the restructuring  
   and consolidation procedure, between 31
st March 1980-2008, the total number of Shinkin and credit cooperative banks  
   was reduced by 40% and 66% to reach 280 and 164 respectively (Japanese Bankers Association). 
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Following  repeated  worldwide  banking  crises,  numerous  bank  regulators  and  researchers  have 
expressed an interest in understanding and analysing the determinants of bank-risk taking and its 
relationship with bank capital. However, knowledge about the banks’ risk-capital behaviour is still 
very limited and mixed. Current research implies that banks tend to be hit by a number of factors 
namely  moral  hazard  provided  by  mispriced  deposit  insurance,  agency  problems,  ownership 
structure and managerial incentive among others.  
On theoretical grounds, some authors argue that capital characterises the degree of loss faced by a 
bank in the event of a bankruptcy.  Thus, if a bank has a higher level of capital, it will incur lower 
risks. A negative relationship between risk and capital also occurs when all deposits are insured 
with  a  flat  premium  rate,  i.e.,  in  the  absence  of  ‘market  discipline’.  Thus,  the  marginal  cost  of 
increasing bank risk and/or lowering the level of capital is zero as the insurance premium remains 
constant with risk or capital. Some also state that risk-taking activities are reduced at commercial 
banks when capital adequacy requirements are introduced (Repullo, 2004; Konishi & Yasuda, 2004; 
and Furlong & Keeley, 1989). In contrast, others argue that higher capital requirements might lead 
to excessive risk-taking by banks as this would lower the bank’s charter value
2 thereby restricting 
bank’s drive to behave cautiously (Besanko and Kanatas, 1996;  Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz, 
2000).   
On the other hand, if capital is regarded as very costly, banks will bear more risks to generate a 
higher return on equity, the higher the level of capital. Banks also have incentives to take higher 
risks with regard to moral hazard by exploiting deposit insurance schemes. Moral hazard occurs 
when central banks, governments, or supervisory agencies lead economic agents to believe that 
they will get involved to protect an institution and its creditors in case of any failure. The moral 
hazard hypothesis could also be developed when analysing agency problems between managers 
                                                 
2  The charter value of a bank represents the present value of the expected stream profits that a bank is expected to obtain  
   on a going concern. This is usually measured as the difference between the market value of a bank’s equity and the  
   value of equity invested by the bank’s shareholders.  
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and shareholders. In an unhealthy banking industry, managers will be less inclined to take on more 
risk. Added to that, well informed managers may employ an expansionary strategy which may end 
up  being  very  risky.  While  it  may  be  a  desirable  explanation,  moral  hazard  is  an  incomplete 
justification  of  the  relationship  between  bank  capital  and  risk-taking.  Under  the  ‘‘too-big-to  fail’’ 
argument, large banks may rely too much on a public bailout in case of financial difficulties as they 
are conscious of their importance in the financial system. Some banks may also choose to bear 
more risk as they assume that they will be bailed out if they fail at the same time as other banks.  
An increasing area of the theoretical literature attempts to assess the effects of minimum capital 
requirements  on  capital  and  banks’  risk.  According  to  the  Basel  Accord  I  (risk-based  capital 
standard), agreed upon in 1988 among G-10 countries, banks are compelled to sustain a certain 
level  of  capital  for  risk-weighted  assets
3. Since then, banks are expected to hold a minimum 
regulatory capital ratio of 8% of all risk-weighted assets. Similarly in Japan, international banks are 
required to maintain a capital to risk-weighted asset ratio of at least 8%. This ratio is also referred to 
as  the  ‘‘BIS’’  (Bank  of  International  Settlements)  ratio.  However,  domestic  banks  in  Japan  are 
subject to a more lenient requirement of a 4% Ministry of Finance (MOF) ratio. 
Basel II
4 (Basel Committee, 2004), the extended version and second of the Basel Accords was 
published in June 2004 to ensure that banks assess and measure other types of risk, including  
operating risks and make adequate provision of capital to guard against the risks they face. It was 
scheduled for implementation by end of 2006/beginning of 2007, but given resource and other 
constraints in some countries, the implementation process continues to move forward around the 
globe. It is important to note that the regulatory framework, including the recent amendments, is 
                                                 
3   Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) is calculated as a weighted sum of assets held by the bank. 
4   Basel II went into effect in Japan in fiscal 2006 (end of March 2007) and required banks to abide to its three pillars.  
    Pillar I is a new method for calculating bank capital adequacy ratios by introducing a risk sensitive, computational  
    formula. Pillar II represents the financial institution’s internal capital adequacy assessment process, followed by  
    supervisory review and evaluation process. Pillar III is appropriate disclosure regarding capital adequacy to be  
    evaluated fairly by the market. (Rixtel, Alexopoulou & Harada,2003 ) ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-12 
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planned with commercial banks in mind and thus ignores the nature of activities of cooperative 
banks
5.  
In  line  with  the  capital  buffer  theory,  banks aim  at  holding  more  capital  than  required  (i.e., 
maintaining regulatory capital above the regulatory minimum) as insurance against breach of the 
regulatory minimum capital requirement. More capital tends to absorb adverse shocks and thus 
reduces the likelihood of failure. Consequently, portfolio risk and regulatory capital are assumed to 
be positively related. Banks raise capital when portfolio risk goes up in order to keep up their capital 
buffer. Indeed, evidence from the US banking sector by Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Jacques and  
Nigro, 1997; and Aggarwal and Jacques, 1998 as well as by Rime, 2001 from Switzerland and Heid, 
Porath, and Stolz, 2003 seems to confirm this positive relationship. As a matter of fact, Shrieves and 
Dahl, 1992 and Jacques and Nigro, 1997 emphasize that changes in risk and capital outlook by 
bank management are simultaneously determined.  
On the other hand, Konishi and Yasuda (2004) analysing the factors determining risk taking at 
Japanese commercial banks, highlight that risk taking activities are reduced at commercial banks 
when capital adequacy requirements are introduced, indicating that the results for Japan differ to 
some extent. A negative relationship between capital and risk is also obtained in UK banks and 
building societies according to Alfon et al (2004). They argue that the possible explanations for 
keeping substantially high capital position are: distance from minimum capital requirement, internal 
risk assessments by bank managers and their skills in managing risk, the level deemed appropriate 
by rating agencies and depositors and the costs of raising extra capital. 
                                                 
5   For example, Fonteyne (2007) argues that ‘‘the third pillar of the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II)—which relies on  
    extensive disclosure to ensure that banks are subject to market discipline—has significantly reduced effectiveness in  
    the case of cooperative banks’’. He also states that ‘‘Cooperatives’ disclosure practices and requirements are  
    substantially below those of commercial banks, especially listed ones’’. 
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While the aforementioned studies focussed mainly on the relationship between risk and capital, 
there is not much evidence on their relationship with efficiency.  Hughes and Moon (1995) and 
Hughes and Mester (1998) thus stress the importance of analysing the impact of efficiency on risk 
and capital. They observe a positive relationship between risk and the level of capital (and liquidity), 
perhaps signalling regulators’ preference for capital as a means of restricting risk-taking activities 
but  a  negative  relationship  between  inefficiency  and  bank  risk-taking. The  relationship  between 
capital, risk and efficiency for a large sample of European banks between 1992 and 2000 was also 
examined by Altunbas et al (2007). They note that inefficient European banks seem to hold more 
capital and undertake less risk. However, they obtain a positive relationship between risks and the 
level of capital for commercial banks. On the other hand, in the case of cooperative banks, they find 
that capital levels are inversely related to risks and that inefficient banks hold lower levels of capital. 
While theory does not provide a clear picture, the empirical evidence on the relationship between 
banks’ risk and capital remains also inconclusive. So far, to the best of our knowledge, empirical 
evidence on the risk-capital relationship in Japanese cooperative banking is not available because 
previous studies focussed on commercial banks. This explains why no reference is made to any 
review of literature for Japanese cooperative banks. We believe that this is a relevant issue given 
that the cooperative banks have experienced substantial asset quality problems and low levels of 
capitalisation since the early 1990s.  
This  paper  thus  attempts  to  fill  the  void  by  addressing  the  following  question:  How  does  a 
cooperative  bank’s  risk-taking  behaviour  depends  on  its  capital  position  (i.e.,  how  does  the 
behaviour of an undercapitalized bank differ from the behaviour of a well-capitalized bank)? We 
thus aim to shed some light on the determinants of bank risk-taking and analyse its relationship with 
capital and efficiency in Japanese cooperative banking. A panel data set of 263 Japanese Shinkin 
and credit cooperatives banks over the period 2003 to 2006 is being tested. Thus, an important 
contribution of our study is that we are focussing on Japanese cooperative banks which haven’t 
been explored so far to our knowledge in this area of research.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-12 
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Our  results  reveal  an  inverse  relationship  between  risk  and  the  level  of  capital  for  Japanese 
cooperative banks, which is similar to results reported for European cooperative banks. However, 
inefficient Japanese cooperative banks hold more capital and take on more risk, contrasting with 
evidence from Europe (Altunbas et al, 2007). We also observe that larger banks hold lower capital, 
are engaged in more risky activities and are inefficient.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines issues to be addressed in this area in terms of 
definitions and measurement. Section 3 presents data and methodology. Section 4 highlights the 
empirical results and finally section 5 draws the conclusion. 
2.  Definition and Measurement: Risk, Capital and Inefficiency 
  2.1 Risk 
In the most basic sense, risk is the probability of financial loss and also refers to the variability of 
returns  associated  with  a  given  asset.    The  Shinkin  Central  Bank  organises  ‘‘risk’’  into  two 
categories – risk that must be controlled and risk that must be minimized. The types of risk that must 
be controlled are credit risk, market risk, and. liquidity risk. On the other hand, operational risk is the 
type of risk that needs to be minimized (Shinkin Central Bank Annual Report, 2008). We shall now 
examine the definition and types of banking risk as follows:- 
 
Risk that must be controlled 
-  Credit risks: the risk of loss when customers fail to comply fully with the terms of a loan or 
contract. However credit risk is not only limited to the risk that borrowers are unable to pay; it 
also accounts for risk of delayed payments which can also be problematic for the bank. 
-  Market risks - the risk of loss arising from adverse fluctuations in assets or liabilities values. 
These fluctuations may be due to changes in interest rates, equity prices, foreign exchange 
rates or commodity prices.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-12 
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-  Liquidity risks - Depository institutions generally use short-term liabilities to finance long-term 
assets  and  thereby  rely  on  additional  deposits  to  satisfy  withdrawal  requests.  However, 
liquidity  risks  may  arise  when  there  are  insufficient  new  deposits  to  cater  withdrawal 
requests, i.e., the institution is unable to generate sufficient cash inflow to meet required 
cash outflows. Thus it represents the inability of the bank to meet its liabilities when they fall 
due. 
 Risk that must be minimized 
-  Operational  risk  –  the  risk  of  unforeseen  loss  due  to  resulting  from  shortcomings  in 
operational  processes;  breaches  in  internal  controls,  employee  actions,  or  computer 
systems, as well as risk of loss arising from external events. 
 
It is important to note that there is no ideal single measure of risk, and as a matter of fact, there are 
a number of measures. They are classified as accounting–based and market-based approaches. 
The  accounting  measures  employ  balance  sheet  ratios  that  represent  traditional  indicators  of 
riskiness. They are namely the ratio of loan-loss reserves to total assets or loan-loss provisions as a 
fraction of either total assets or gross loans to reflect credit risk. On the other hand, market-based 
measures are captured by the standard deviation of daily stock returns. Shrieves and Dahl, 1992 
and Jacques and Nigro, 1997, use the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets to measure risk.  
 
2.2 Capital 
The capital of a financial institution comprises mainly retained earnings and funds from issuing 
stock. It is important to understand that capital is not synonymous with liquidity. A firm can be highly 
capitalized, that is, can have more assets than liabilities, but may at the same time experience 
liquidity problems if the assets cannot be sold quickly for cash or any other sources of liquidity to 
meet other needs. There are three concepts of capital; actual, regulatory and economic as follows:- 
-  Actual capital refers to the physical capital which is represented within the  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-12 
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balance sheet as equity and long-term debt. It is usually measured as the ratio of equity to 
total assets, also known as the capital ratio.  
-  Regulatory  capital  relates  to  risk-based  capital  which  the  bank  maintains  in  line  with 
supervisory determined rules and is measured as the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets 
(also referred as risk-based capital ratio).  
-  Finally, economic capital represents the maximum amount of capital that a bank requires to 
operate its business effectively based on its business strategies.  
 
2.3 Inefficiency 
Studies of X-efficiency estimate a best practice cost function which denotes the forecasted cost 
function of banks that are X-efficient and then measure the degree of inefficiency in the sample 
relative to this best practice. In other words, a bank is considered as inefficient if its costs are higher 
than those predicted for an efficient bank producing the same input/output configuration and the 
difference  cannot  be  explained  by  statistical  noise  (Altunbas  et  al,  2001).  Efficiency  can  be 
measured  in  two  ways;  nonparametric  programming  (Charnes  et  al,  1978)  and  parametric 
stochastic frontier technique (Aigner et al, 1977). The major difference between the techniques is 
that the parametric frontier (production, cost or profit frontier) assumes that maximising behaviour 
exists. Another difference is that while parametric techniques measure allocative efficiencies, the 
non-parametric ones measure technical efficiencies.   
The most widely used nonparametric technique is labelled as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
and the most widely used parametric technique is called Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Both 
techniques have their advantages and disadvantages, but the choice depends on the situation. DEA 
measures bank’s efficiency by the ratio of its own cost to the cost of the 'best practice' bank that 
faces the same input prices and produces the same output bundle.  One benefit of DEA is that it 
does not dictate a particular functional form. However, one drawback of DEA analysis is that it does 
not allow for any error in the data, thus stating that all the error term is accredited to inefficiency. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-12 
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Detailed information about nonparametric methods can be found in Styrin (2005), and Hsien-Chang 
Kuo et al. (2008).  
On the other hand, in the SFA analysis, a bank is labelled as inefficient if its costs are higher than 
the costs predicted for an efficient bank producing the same output/input price combination and the 
difference cannot be explained by statistical noise. In other words, it breaks down the error term into 
the expected value of inefficiency and random variation (measurement error). The random error 
takes either a positive or negative value. In cost functions, the inefficiency term is always positive as 
it raises costs. Since some studies argue that this approach may lead to biased results, Battese and 
Coelli  (1995)  extend  and  improve  on  SFA  by  estimating  the  impact  of  the  determinants  of 
inefficiency  simultaneously  with  the  efficient  frontier  by  applying  iterative  maximum  likelihood 
procedure. This method has been gaining ground in bank efficiency literature. 
3.  Data and methodology 
3.1  Data and sample 
We use a panel data set of individual Japanese Shinkin and credit cooperative banks for the period 
2003 to 2006. Data were collected from banks’ balance sheets and income statements obtained 
from the Fitch IBCA Bankscope database to construct standard accounting measures of risk activity.  
The  sample  comprises  a  large  set  of  panel  data  of  263  banks  over  the  four  years  under 
consideration. Shinkin banks dominate the sample, comprising 74% of the total. The number of 
banks is limited by data availability. All variables in this study are measured in YEN (billions).  
 
3.2 Methodology  
We adopt the approach suggested by Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Jacques and Nigro (1997), Kwan 
and Eisenbeis (1996), Hughes and Mester (1998) and Rime (2001) to estimate the relationship 
between  risk,  capital  and  efficiency.  They  underline  that  capital  and  risk  decisions  are  made 
simultaneously and are interrelated. This endogeneity can make OLS estimators inconsistent and 
thus  calls  for  the  use  of  a  simultaneous  equation  specification  and  estimation  methodology. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-12 
 
  10 
 
However, like Altunbas et al (2007), we modify the approach by using the level rather than changes 
of data as we are limited by the length of data period. To allow for simultaneity between banks’ risk, 
capital and efficiency, a system of equations is being used and estimated using two-stage least 





3 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 ,
2 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 ,
1 , 4 , 3 2 , 1 0 ,
e OBSTA SIZE RISK CAP INEFF
e ROA SIZE INEFF RISK CAP
e NLTA SIZE INEFF CAP RISK
t i t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i
  
 
Banking sector risk is represented by equation (1), bank capital by equation (2) and determinants of 
bank inefficiency by equation (3). Based on the different definitions of risk described in the previous 
section, this paper focuses on accounting measures of risk proxied by credit risk. It is worth noting 
that measuring banks’ risk can be difficult for those institutions that do not have regular traded 
securities (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992, Rime, 2001). Since the Japanese cooperative banks do not 
have  public  traded  securities,  we  resort  to  the  use  of  accounting  measures  of  banking  risk. 
However, one limitation of the accounting measure is that managers may have some influence over 
these measures and can thus exercise cautious in a way to minimize regulatory costs. Equation 1 
uses loan-loss reserves as a fraction to total assets (RISKi,t) to capture banking risk. Higher levels of 
loans loss reserves signal higher banking risk. In our study, capital is proxied by the ratio of equity 
to total assets (CAPi,t), which align with the definition used by Shrieves and Dahl (1992). We could 
not use risk-based capital ratio as the data was not available.  
We use the concept of X-efficiency to compute bank cost inefficiency. X-inefficiencies are usually 
the combination of technical and allocative inefficiencies (Leibenstein, 1996). Technical efficiency  
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represents the ability of the firm to produce maximum output from a given sets of inputs, while 
allocative efficiency refers to the ability of a firm to use the inputs in optimal proportions given their 
respective prices and technology. A combination of both provides a measure of cost efficiency when 
cost is observed instead of production. Individual bank cost inefficiency (INEFFi,t) is obtained as the 
distance of a firm’s observed operating costs to the minimum or ‘best-practice’ efficient cost frontier 
and is derived using the stochastic efficient cost-frontier methodology of Aigner et al.(1977)
6. 
                                                 
6 We base our discussion on the stochastic efficient frontier production methodology developed by Aigner et al  
   1977) to measure the X-inefficiency of each banking firm. From this formulation, the stochastic cost function model  
    was developed. For more illustration, see Schmidt and Lovell (1979) and Kwan & Eisenbeis (1996). In this  
    method, a banks’ observed cost is formulated to deviate from cost-efficient frontier due to random noise and  
    inefficiency.  
      For the n th Firm,    
  ) 4 ( .......... ) ln , (ln ln n j i n P Q f TC  
      Where TC n is the total operating costs (including interest costs), outputs Qi (loans and other Earning assets),  
       input prices Pj (wages, interest costs and other operating costs). 
      In equation (4),  n   measures the distance of banks’ actual total costs to the cost-efficient frontier and includes  
      the following two-component disturbance term of the form:- 
    ) 5 ( .......... n n n V U  
      Where  n V represents the random term and assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)                      
      N (0,
2 ) 
      n U  accounts for cost inefficiency in production and assumed to be distributed independently of  n V  and a half-  
      normal distribution i.e. the absolute value of a variable that is i.i.d. N (0, 
2
u )  
     To specify the cost function in equation (4), we employ the following multiproduct translog cost function using  
      intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977):- 
) 6 .........( ln ln ln ln 2 / 1
ln ln 2 / 1 ln ln ln 0
j i ij h j i h j jh j
k i k ik i j j j i i i
P Q P P
Q Q P Q TC  
     The Cost-inefficiency of firm n, defined as Cn, is expressed as the expected value of  n U conditional on  n   
       (Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt, 1982): ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-12 
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The bank-specific variables consist of net loans to total assets (NLTAi,t); loan growth may increase 
risk and have an unfavourable impact on capital and bank efficiency.  The variable logarithm of total 
assets (SIZEi,t) is also incorporated to account for the effect of size in the bank´s capital position. 
Large banks are expected to have a greater degree of leverage (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997). On 
the other hand, Hughes, Mester and Moon (2001) suggest that big banks usually hold less capital 
as compared to smaller ones as they benefit from diversification and other size advantages.  
In addition to risk and inefficiency, the capital level of cooperative banks is also likely to be linked to 
earnings (ROAi,t), as retained earnings represent the main basis for banks to improve their capital 
position. The level of capital is expected to be positively related to the profitability of the banking 
firm, as earnings will be ploughed back into reserves. For example, earlier studies by Berger (1995) 
observe that profits and capital are positively related in US banking. Finally, the ratio of off-balance-
sheet items to total assets (OBSTAi,t) is also included to capture off-balance sheet (OBS) activities 
(loan commitments, standby letters of credit and commercial papers). OBS activities help banks to 
increase  their  sources  of  revenue  without  adjusting  their  capital  structure.  The  moral  hazard 
hypothesis states that OBS activities increase bank risk and thus leads to inefficiency. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
2 / [ /(1 )][ ( / )/ ( / ) / ].........(7) n n n n n n C E U  
    Where:- 
    λ : Ratio of the standard deviation of  n U to standard deviation of  n V (i.e.,  v u / );
2 2 2
v u   
    : Cumulative standard normal density function, and  :  Standard normal density function 




    We computed the estimates of  n C for each bank in the sample period using a program called Frontier Version 4.1  
    devised by Coelli (1996) for Stochastic Frontier Production and Cost function estimation by the method of      
    maximum likelihood. We are grateful to Prof. T.Coelli for responding to questions on the calculations of firm  
    efficiency level in the FRONTIER programme.  
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4.  Empirical Results 
 
This section presents results derived from the simultaneous model described above where risk, 
capital  and  cost  inefficiency  are  the  endogenous  variables.  Two  stage  least  squares  with  fixed 
effects
7 estimation has been used and the results for each equation are disclosed separately for 
ease of explanation. We have adopted the ‘balanced panel’ approach, whereby each bank is always 
represented in each time period. A challenge in modelling a panel with long-time dimension is that 
variables are likely to be non-stationary. However, our sample has only four years time dimension. 
We thus investigate the nature of stationarity of our data by conducting unit root tests (Maddala and 
Wu, 1999). The test statistics reject the null hypothesis that the variables are non-stationary. This 
may be due to the short time dimension of our panel data set. A White test (1980) was also carried 
out to investigate cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and the hypothesis of homoscedasticity is not 
rejected at the 5% level of significance. We also conduct a Hausman test for the endogeneity of 
risk, capital and inefficiency variables and the null hypothesis that they are endogeneous is not 
rejected at 5% significance level.  First, we report our findings on the determinants of bank risk, 
followed by that of capital and inefficiency equations. Bank and time heterogeneity are captured by 
the use of fixed effects estimation procedure.         
 
4.1 Determinants of banking risk 
Table 1 summarizes the regression results for the estimation of the risk equation derived from the 
simultaneous estimation.  An accounting measure of bank risk (loan-loss reserves as a proportion of 
total assets, RISK) is used as the dependent variable. The ratio of equity to total assets (CAP) is 
significantly and negatively related to risk. In other words, Japanese cooperative banks with lower 
capital take on more risk. The results are similar to those obtained for European cooperative banks 
as discussed in the introduction of the paper. This may reflect the moral hazard problem whereby 
                                                 
7 Generally, the estimation procedure is intended for consistency (Baltagi, 2001). Fixed effects and instrumental variables are used  
   to sort out any possible endogeneity between errors and regressors. Hausman Test was also conducted and the rejection of the  
   null hypothesis shows that fixed effects is preferred in this case against random effects (GLS). ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-12 
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banks exploit the benefits of deposit insurance. Previous studies show evidence that cooperative 
banks engage in less risky activities. Some authors observe that cooperative banks are more stable 
than commercial banks. For instance, the Swiss Raiffeisen banks resisted the real estate crisis of 
the early 1990s and French cooperative banks were less hit than commercial banks during times of 
banking  stress  in  the  1980s  and  1990s.  Italian  cooperatives  also  suffered  lower  loan  losses  in 
recent years (Cihak and Hesse, 2007).       
In the case of the inefficiency (INEFF) variable,  the positive effect  of inefficiency on risk-taking 
supports the view that inefficient banks are more vulnerable to risk-taking than high more efficient 
ones. Larger cooperative banks come out to be more risky than their smaller counterparts as shown 
by the positive sign of SIZE. Net lending (NLTA) is inversely related to risk, thereby indicating that 
loan growth is linked to loan-loss reserves level.  
     
Table 1: Bank risks (RISKi,t as the dependent variable)
Variable Coefficient Standard error T-value
Constant -0.3307* 0.0178 -18.5598
CAPi,t -0.4963* 0.0882 -5.6293
INEFFi,t 0.3300* 0.0164 20.076
SIZEi,t 0.0078* 0.0021 3.7000
NLTAi,t -0.0230* 0.0089 -2.5713
Note: * denotes significance at the 5 per cent level




Estimates from the risk equation derived from the simultaneous equations using 2 SLS 
approach with fixed effects estimation are described using loan-loss reserves to total assets 
(RISKi,t) as the dependent bank risk variable.  The table reports the results obtained for 
Japanese Shinkin and credit cooperatives banks over the years 2003 to 2006. Independent 
variables include bank-specific indicators (denoted by subscripts i) at period (subscript t).  
The bank-specific indicators include: equity to assets ratios for bank i at period t (CAPi,t); 
cost inefficiency estimates derived from stochatic cost frontier estimation (INEFFi,t) for each 
bank; size of each bank proxied by the natural log of total assets (SIZEi,t) and the net loans 
to total assets ratio (NLTAi,t) for each bank.
     
 
4.2 Capital Equation 
Table  2  reports  the  results  for  equation  (2)  where  capital  is  used  as  the  dependent  variable. 
Cooperative banks with higher risk hold a smaller amount of capital as reflected by the negative and ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-12 
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significant sign of RISK. This may suggest that there is lack of intervention by regulators in forcing 
riskier cooperative banks to hold more capital. There is also evidence of moral hazard incentives as 
more inefficient cooperative banks run with larger amounts of capital as captured by the positive 
coefficient  of  INEFF.  As  per  expectations,  we  obtain  a  positive  relationship  between  return  on 
assets (ROA) and capital, such that banks with higher earnings also tend to operate with high 
capital. This could be explained by the fact that cooperative banks usually depend on retained 
earnings as they have fewer alternatives to increase their capital ratios as compared to other banks. 
Added to that, cooperative banks usually require considerable investment in retail infrastructure and 
human resources, and these in turn allow them to achieve high returns on assets. The negative 
relationship between size and capital may be attributed to the fact that larger banks will aim at a 
lower capital ratio as they have easier access to capital and can raise capital more easily due to 
lower transaction costs.  
      
Table 2: Bank Capital (CAPi,t as the dependent variable)
Variable Coefficient Standard error T-value
Constant -0.2247* 0.0448 -5.0158
RISKi,t -0.7703* 0.1132 -6.8035
INEFFi,t 0.2619* 0.0355 7.3803
SIZEi,t -0.0007 0.0040 -0.1748
ROAi,t 0.0919* 0.0286 3.2132
Note: * denotes significance at the 5 per cent level




Estimates from the capital equation derived from the simultaneous equations using 2 
SLS approach with fixed effects estimation are described using equity to assets ratios 
for bank i at period t (CAPi,t)  as the dependent bank capital variable.  The table 
reports the results obtained for Japanese Shinkin and credit cooperatives banks over 
the years 2003 to 2006. Independent variables include bank-specific indicators 
(denoted by subscripts i) at period (subscript t).  The bank-specific indicators 
include:loan-loss reserves to total assets (RISKi,t); cost inefficiency estimates derived 
from stochatic cost frontier estimation (INEFFi,t) for each bank; size of each bank 




4.3 Inefficiency equation 
Table 3 shows that bank capital (CAP) has a significant and positive coefficient implying that better 
capitalised firms operate less efficiently than undercapitalised ones. This contrasts with the results ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-12 
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in most of the literature analysing the determinants of bank efficiency (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; 
Berger and Young, 1997) that well capitalised banks are better run. As regard to the effects of risk 
on efficiency, the results are in line with those in the risk equation. The accounting measure of credit 
risk (RISK) is positively and significantly related to inefficiency. It suggests that operating inefficiency 
may be the result of managing a larger amount of loans. Contrary to expectations, off-balance sheet 
items to total assets (OBSTA) appears to be negatively related to inefficiency suggesting that banks 
who are more actively involved in OBS activities operate more efficiently. 
      
Table 3: Cost Inefficiency (INEFFi,t as the dependent variable)
Variable Coefficient Standard error T-value
Constant 0.8740* 0.1243 7.0331
CAPi,t 2.4727* 0.9807 2.5214
RISKi,t 4.4625* 1.3232 3.3726
SIZEi,t 0.0171 0.0329 0.5212
OBSTAi,t -0.5857 0.5583 -1.0491
Note: * denotes significance at the 5 per cent level




Estimates from the capital equation (model 3) derived from the simultaneous equations using 
2 SLS approach with fixed effects estimation are described using cost inefficiency estimates 
derived from stochatic cost frontier estimation (INEFFi,t) for each bank as the dependent bank 
capital variable. The table reports the results obtained for Japanese Shinkin and credit 
cooperatives banks over the years 2003 to 2006. Independent variables include bank-specific 
indicators (denoted by subscripts i) at period (subscript t).  The bank-specific indicators 
include:loan-loss reserves to total assets (RISKi,t);equity to assets ratios for bank i at period t 
(CAPi,t); size of each bank proxied by the natural log of total assets (SIZEi,t) and the ratio of off-
balance-sheet items to total assets (OBSTAi,t)  for each bank.
 
5.  Conclusion  
This  paper  reports  the  relationship  between  risk,  capital  and  efficiency  for  a  large  sample  of 
Japanese cooperative banks between 2003 and 2006. We adopt a simultaneous equation model in 
which risk, capital and cost inefficiency are modelled as dependent variables. The results confirm 
the  belief  that  risk,  capital  and  inefficiency  are  simultaneously  determined.  Empirical  evidence 
reveals  an  inverse  relationship  between  risks  on  the  level  of  capital  but  we  find that  inefficient 
cooperative banks take on more risk and hold a higher level of capital. This somehow supports the 
moral hazard behaviour whereby inefficient banks are more prone to engage in more risk-taking 
activities. Banking capital has a negative influence on efficiency of Japanese cooperatives banks ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-12 
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suggesting that better capitalised banks tend to operate less efficiency.  As regards to size, larger 
cooperative banks holding less capital, take on more risk and are less efficient. Overall our results 
suggest that regulators should monitor closely bank loan expansion, efficiency and capital adequacy 
requirement on risk-taking activities so as to ensure a safer operating environment for cooperative 
banks in Japan.   
However, one limitation of this study is that we have focussed our analysis on levels rather than 
changes. In other words, we examine whether the level of risk is related to the level of capital and 
efficiency. This is mostly due to the small sample period based on data availability. It may be more 
convenient  to  look  at  changes;  given  some  of  the  previous  studies  have  emphasized  on  risk 
changes and capital augmentation (e.g. Shrieves and Dahl, 1992).  
Further studies could compare our findings with that of Japanese commercial banks so as to get 
more insight of risk-bank behaviour.  As discussed earlier, Basel II went into effect in Japan in fiscal 
year 2006 (end of March 2007). It will be interesting to compare our findings with the post-Basel II 
period to observe the effects of Basel II on the risk-capital relationship.  
Cooperative banks are also involved in risk-taking activities but to a lesser extent than commercial 
banks. This  is  because  they  are  less  driven  by  the  need  to  maximize  profits for  investors  and 
bonuses  for  managers. For  instance,  under  the  present  financial  crisis  marked  by  the  massive 
public bail-out of private investor-owned banks worldwide, hardly any cooperative banks have asked 
for government help (Birchall and Ketilson, ILO, 2009). By focusing on the needs of their members, 
most cooperatives banks worldwide have escaped the excessive risk-taking that hit many large 
global financial institutions. Thus they continue to play an even more important role as consumers 
and  businesses  face  a  credit  crunch  by  supplying  funds  to  their  clients.  We  thus  believe  that 
cooperatives banks may not be the solution to the world’s problems but they are certainly part of the 
solution.  
 ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-12 
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